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Harry Potter and the Three-Second Crime:
Are We Vanishing the De Minimis Defense from Copyright Law?
Julie D. Cromer*
Enter, stranger, but take heed
Of what awaits the sin of greed, 
For those who take, but do not earn,
Must pay most dearly those in turn.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the first of the extraordinary Harry Potter series, the quote above is etched into 
a brass plate at the front entrance of the wizard bank, alluding to the powerful goblin 
magic that guards its contents.  Interestingly enough, of all the chapters of magic and 
mysticism found in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, this quote is one of three 
passages also found on the packaging of the compact disc set, perhaps betraying the fear 
of the distributors of piracy or digital sampling.
Such sentiments appear to have pervaded the U.S. courts as well when 
considering music sampling and other small pieces of copyrighted works that before may 
have been excused from infringement by the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex – the 
law does not concern itself with trifles.  For example, the Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films2 held the de minimis doctrine inapplicable to the potential 
infringement of sound recordings, suggesting that even the tiniest of infringements would 
render the alleged infringer liable to the copyright owner.  The Bridgeport decision 
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 J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (Scholastic) at 72.
2 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (hereinafter “Bridgeport”).  
2highlights a dilemma for copyright law:  The technological ability to infringe also means 
the technological ability to detect infringements that are potentially infinitesimal.  If the 
de minimis defense is truly unavailable in certain instances, it is likely that courts may 
restrict its application in others, perhaps leading to its outright revocation.  
This paper examines the importance of the de minimis doctrine in copyright law 
and these potential conclusions.  It evaluates the history of application of the de minimis
doctrine in copyright law, establishing that courts have long turned to the doctrine for 
guidance in copyright decisions.  Further, it reviews legislative history to determine 
whether the application of the de minimis doctrine is indeed contrary to Congressional 
purposes, as recent decisions suggest, and if there may be sufficient justification for its 
abolition in connection with sound recordings only.  It studies the effects of the doctrine’s 
elimination, evaluating whether copyright law written without the understood de minimis
doctrine would be a workable regime.  It then looks at other works that rely on 
technology for their existence, and see whether Congress or the courts have imposed such 
a bright-line rule on the reproduction right of those works as well, or if they are going to 
make such an imposition.  Finally, the paper questions whether revocation of the de 
minimis doctrine and the substantial similarity test helps or hinders the “Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts,” asking whether policy dictates that the technological ease of 
copying should in fact lead to the less stringent application of copyright law to future 
works.
II. DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX
Before analyzing the de minimis defense in connection with copyright law, it is 
necessary to examine the nature of the defense.  The legal maxim de minimis non curat 
3lex translates literally into “the law does not concern itself about trifles.”3  In other words, 
an infraction of the law may be so insubstantial that, although technically a right may 
have been violated, the violation or the effect of that violation is trivial enough for the 
court to ignore the infraction altogether.  While the debate about the application of the 
maxim has a fresh contemporary treatment in the field of copyright, the maxim has a 
longstanding history that has guided courts for centuries and an application that 
transcends legal fields.
A. HISTORY
While historically, little exists to suggest why the maxim itself began to appear in 
legal opinions,4 it is likely that English courts in the seventeenth century had little 
patience for cases or causes of action that were seen to be trivial or a waste of the courts’ 
meager resources.5  As a matter of common sense, application of the maxim de minimis 
non curat lex can be seen as a means of judicial economy .
The English court system long used some kind of test to determine whether a 
claim was too insignificant, trivial, or petty to be litigated at bar.  At least as early as 
3
 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).  Also “The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or 
trifling matters.”  Id. Case law has regularly substituted the preposition “with” for the word “about.”  See, 
e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (hereinafter “Ringgold”).
4
 The idea that there are matters too trivial to be brought before a higher authority has longer roots than any
English law can suggest.  For example, 1 Corinthians states:  “If any of you has a dispute with another, dare 
he take it before the ungodly for judgment instead of before the saints? Do you not know that the saints will 
judge the world? And if you are to judge the world, are you not competent to judge trivial cases? …Is it 
possible that there is nobody among you wise enough to judge a dispute between believers? …The very 
fact that you have lawsuits among you means you have been completely defeated already.”  The Holy 
Bible, 1 Corinthians 6:1-2, 5, 7 (New International Version).
5 See, e.g., W.L. Burdick, The Bench and Bar of Other Lands (Wm. S. Hein & Co., 1982) at 3 (“At other 
times [the Court] followed [the King] from place to place to the great inconvenience and hardship of 
suitors, often practically denying them a hearing by reason of the great expense, difficulty of access, and 
loss of time involved.”) (discussing import of Magna Charta fixing the court in one place). 
41650,6 English courts and barristers used the doctrine to prevent the entry of writs of error 
where the harm to the injured was perceived to be small.7 The invocation of the de 
minimis maxim suggested that the litigation was frivolous, and that judicial resources 
should be reserved for those cases where the damage was greater or the harm more 
significant. For example, in Marshe’s Case, a previously convicted man applied to the 
court for a writ of error; his judgment had been reversed, and he wanted to recover the 
property taken from him as a result of his conviction.  The executor of the property 
argued against the writ, suggesting that because the property taken as a result of his 
conviction could be returned to the man upon his motion, no injury could result to the 
man to justify the extraordinary relief of the writ.8  Similarly, in the 1658 case Wats v. 
Dix, the court found that where the intent of the parties was manifest in a lease, a small 
variance in the terms would not serve to offset the lease:  “[H]ere the agreement and the 
intention of the parties is satisfied, and the variance is not considerable, & de minimis 
non curat lex.”9
1. AMERICAN APPLICATION 
As the American colonies and later the United States began to import legal 
concepts from English courts, so did they introduce legal maxims such as de minimis non 
6See Marshes Case, In B.R. Rot. 1011, Owen, 147-48, 964-65, Mich. 32 & 33 Eliz. (1650) (“If a man be 
indicted before a coroner, quod fugam fecit, if he after reverse the indictment, yet he shall have his goods, 
for de minimis non curat lex….”).  See also County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 67, 23 L.Ed 59, 
23 Wall. 46 (1874) (citing Blackstone’s definition of boundaries changed by water, and noting that 
“Blackstone takes his definition from Bracton…a judge in the reign of Henry III”).
7See Marshe’s Case, Cro. Eliz. 273-74, 528-29, 1 Leon. 325.  Owen, 147.  1 Roll. Abr. 558.  Godb. 377. 
380. Swinb. 367.  2 Hawk. 654.  1 Salk. 295.  Co. Lit. 256. b. Easter Term, 34 Eliz. In B.R. (1653).
8
 The court held otherwise.  See Marshe’s case, supra note __ (holding that an outlawry cannot be reversed 
by plea, but should be handled by writ).
9 See Wats v. Dix, Hill. 1649. Banc. Sup. Trin. Car. Rot. 1529. Style, 204-205.  647-48 (1658) (citation 
omitted) (holding “[t]he intent of the parties shall not be implyed against the direct rules of law.”).
5curat lex. As early as 1796, only five years into the history of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Justice Paterson invoked the concept in a concurring opinion to suggest that the law being 
discussed was trivial in comparison with the other values at stake at the time:
When this law was passed, the depreciation, I believe, was little 
felt, and not at all acknowledged.  De minimis non curat lex, is an 
old law maxim.  I may parody it on this occasion, by saying De 
minimis non curat libertas.  When the life, liberty, property, every 
thing dear to man was at stake, few could have coldness of heart 
enough to watch the then scarcely perceptible gradation in the 
value of money.10
The Supreme Court revisited the legal maxim several times in its first century in 
diverse areas such as contract (“a corporation, unless it be in matters to which the maxim 
de minimis non curat lex applies, can act or speak, and, of course, contract, only by 
writing”);11 admiralty (“this pretension [of maritime jurisprudence] entirely reverses the 
maxim of that venerable, though neglected common law, De minimis non curat lex; a 
trespass in the harbor of New York would else be a quarry upon which it would disdain 
to stoop”);12 and property (“in these cases the law is held to be that if the gain be by little 
and little, by small and imperceptible degrees, it shall go to the owner of the land 
adjoining.  For de minimis non curat lex…”);13 and lawyers argued the maxim as a 
defense before the Court.14  Far from remaining an antiquated nuance of the law, 
10 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 267 (1796) (noting that when a law regarding bond payment was passed, the 
barely perceptible depreciation was not acknowledged).
11 See Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 103 (1827).
12 The Steamboat New York v Rea, 59 U.S. 223, 227 (1855) (GRIER, J., dissenting).
13 County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 67 (1870).
14 See Barnard v. Adams, 51 U.S. 270, 299 (1850) (arguing that one moment of hesitation on the part of a 
ship’s crew could not alone determine the contribution interests of the ship); McAndrews v. Thatcher, 70 
U.S. 347, 359 (1865) (arguing because the portion of a cargo damaged in a shipping incident only 
amounted to 1/144 its value, the shipper could not be held liable for contribution).
6however, the de minimis maxim has guided the decisions of the Supreme Court into the 
twentieth century.  In a boundary dispute between two states, the Supreme Court found 
that the private property claims of individuals had no bearing on the boundary between 
the states:
In a great controversy like this, where thousands of acres of land 
are involved and the rights of hundreds of people, the adverse 
attitude of two people claiming about 200 acres of land out of 
8,000 or more cannot prevent the application of legal and equitable 
principles usual in such cases for the settlement of a controversy.  
De minimis non curat lex.15
The Court has also related the maxim to subjects more contemporary than that of state 
boundary lines, such as family law.16
The shortened version of the maxim, de minimis, has become so commonplace, 
the Court has come to regard it as an adjective to describe legally trivial or insignificant 
without undertaking a full analysis of whether the subject matter is in fact legally trivial 
or insignificant.  For example, the Court found that “…associational burdens posed by 
the hard-money transfer restriction [to fund election expenditures] are so insubstantial as 
to be de minimis.”17
However, the Court has also made it clear that a de minimis defense is not 
automatically apply to every area of the law.  In Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, the Court 
15 See State of Maryland v. State of West Virginia, 217 U.S. 1, 21 (1910) (finding that the property patents 
granted to two individuals by the state of Maryland in disputed territory could not override the legal 
boundary drawn up hundreds of years ago, displacing several hundred inhabitants of West Virginia and 
depriving them of their property).
16 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972) (“The State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is 
de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father.”).
17 See McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 172 (2003); see also Locke v. Davey, 540 
U.S. 712 (“We have found nothing to indicate … that these [state constitutional] provisions [prohibiting 
expenditure of tax dollars to support religion] would not have applied so long as the State equally supported 
other professions or if the amount at stake was de minimis.”).
7noted, “Although the Secretary does suggest that the tax is so small in amount as to have 
no practical impact at all, we have never recognized a ‘de minimis’ defense to a charge of 
discretionary taxation under the Commerce Clause.”18 The notion that violations of 
Constitutional rights may not be subject to a de minimis defense was reinforced as 
recently as 2004 in a concurring opinion, which notes that “[t]here are no de minimis 
violations of the Constitution – no constitutional harms so slight that the courts are 
obliged to ignore them.”19
2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court first recognized the possible application of a defense of de 
minimis non curat lex in connection with intellectual property in 1873, when in a patent 
case three members of the Court dissented from the construction of the statutory rights 
granted a patentee.  The majority found that in a certain class of machines or implements, 
“when they are once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on their use to be 
implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees.”20  The dissent 
disagreed, but recognized that in certain instances use of a patented machine may be 
subject to the de minimis defense:
If the patented thing be an article of wearing apparel, sold by the 
assignee within his district, it is confidently asked, cannot the 
purchaser wear the article outside of the district?  The answer to 
acute suggestions of this sort would probably be found (in the 
absence of bad faith in the parties) in the maxim de minimis non 
curat lex.21
18
 516 U.S. 325, 333 n.3, 116 S. Ct. 848, 855, 133 L. Ed. 2d 796, 806 (1996) (considering whether North 
Carolina’s intangibles tax discriminates against the dormant Commerce Clause). 
19 See Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2323 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).
20 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457, 21 L. Ed. 700, 17 Wall. 453 (1873).
21 See id. (BRADLEY, J., dissenting).
8Patent law recognizes legally insignificant differences in patent prosecution as well; the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences recently noted that “Two depressions 
amounted to a de minimis difference from the prior art,” denying protection to the 
petitioner patent-seeker.22  Trademark law incorporates a de minimis analysis into certain 
aspects of its doctrine, managing to protect both slight infringers and trademark owners 
simultaneously.  The trademark doctrine of progressive encroachment, for example,
“allows a trademark owner to tolerate de minimis or low-level infringements and still 
have the right to act promptly when a junior user either gradually edges into causing 
serious harm or suddenly expands or changes its mark.”23
Application of the de minimis maxim has even longer roots in copyright law.  The 
first published copyright decision incorporating the maxim emerged in 1847, finding that 
a “trifling” novelty in the arrangement of entries in a dictionary of flowers was not 
sufficient to garner copyright protection.24 Noted the circuit court, “Some similarities, 
and some use of prior works, even to copying of small parts, are in such cases tolerated, if 
the main design and execution are in reality novel or improved, and not a mere cover for 
important piracies from others.”25 The court continued:
A novelty in arrangement, especially so trifling as this, without any 
new material connected with it, seemed…of questionable 
sufficiency to be protected by a copyright.  The master seemed to 
22 See In re Uie S. Chung, No. 00-1148, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 24916 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2000) (affirming a 
rejection of a patent application).
23 See AM General Corp. v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 311 F. 3d 796, 823 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying 
application of the progressive encroachment doctrine in connection with the Humvee grille).
24 Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 516, 520 (D. Mass. 1847).  [
25 Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. at 517.
9be of the same opinion, on the ground “De minimis non curat 
lex.”26
Courts applied the common law defense of de minimis non curat lex sporadically, 
though its principles were embodied in several ways.  For example, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted copyright law to require that more than a trivial amount of originality 
would be required before the work could be deemed subject to copyright.27  Courts 
interpreting whether joint authors each had copyright in the work analyzed each author’s 
contribution individually, finding that if it were insignificant, then he could not be 
considered a joint author of the work.28
B. THE DE MINIMIS DEFENSE IN COPYRIGHT
The modern application of the de minimis common law defense for copyright 
infringement focuses on either the amount of the work that has been infringed or the 
economic value of the damage incurred by the infringing party.  Courts have interpreted 
that the defense applies in three distinct ways.  First, the de minimis defense will apply 
where the “technical violation of a right [is] so trivial that the law will not impose legal 
consequences.”29  Second, “de minimis can mean that copying has occurred to such a 
trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative threshold of substantial similarity, which is 
always a required element of actionable copying….”30  Third, “de minimis might be 
26 Id. at 519.
27See, e.g., Feist v. Rural Telephone and Telegraph, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
28 See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the principle 
of “de minimis” “requires that ‘more than a word or line must be added by one who claims to be a joint 
author’”); citing Nimmer on Copyright, § 6.07, at 6-21.
29 See Ringgold, supra n. __ at 74.
30 Id.
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considered relevant to the defense of fair use.”31  In judicial opinions and by Congress, 
these applications have repeatedly surfaced in copyright law, expanding the visibility of 
the de minimis defense, if not the defense itself.  
1. TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF COPYRIGHT
A violation of copyright can be deemed so trivial or insignificant that it does not 
warrant the legal consequences of litigation.  Technical infringements happen every day.  
Strictly speaking, downloading or printing content off the Internet would be to make a 
copy, a “material object[]…in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated…”.32  The right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies” vests 
exclusively in the copyright owner,33 and the person who “violates any of the exclusive 
rights of the copyright owner…is an infringer of the copyright.”34  A person who prints 
driving directions from a web site on the Internet, technically, is an infringer.  As the 
Second Circuit has stated:
Trivial copying is a significant part of modern life.  Most honest 
citizens in the world frequently engage, without hesitation, in 
trivial copying that, but for the de minimis doctrine, would 
technically constitute a violation of the law.  We do not hesitate to 
make a photocopy of a letter from a friend to show to another 
friend, or of a favorite cartoon to post on the refrigerator.  Parents 
in Central park photograph their children perched on Jose de 
Creeft’s Alice in Wonderland sculpture.  We record television 
31 Id. at 75.
32
 17 U.S.C. § 101.
33
 17 U.S.C. § 106.  The remaining five rights are the right to prepare derivative works based on the 
copyrighted works; to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work; to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; to display the copyrighted work publicly; and to perform a copyrighted sound 
recording digitally. Id.
34
 17 U.S.C. § 501.
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programs aired while we are out, so as to watch them at a more 
convenient hour.35
Courts rarely use this interpretation of the maxim, specifying insignificant 
technical violations of copyright, in legal opinions; this use in itself suggests “questions 
that never need to be answered.”36 However, given definitions courts have given to de 
minimis violations falling under substantial similarity and fair use, which account for 
violations of insignificant portions of the work itself, it appears that the technical 
violation interpretation connotes an insignificant economic damage.  For example, in 
Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc., although the defendant’s 
promotional card around plastic packaging containing a toy included an illustration of the 
plaintiff’s product,37 the Second Circuit affirmed that because it was only an office copy 
never used, a copyright claim with respect to that card would fall “squarely within the 
principle of de minimis non curat lex.”38 Where sales occur or where the defendant 
receives royalties for an allegedly infringing product, courts are less likely to employ the 
technical violation application of the de minimis defense;39 a true de minimis defense 
35 See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-56 (1984) and noting that “[t]he Supreme Court…found such  [time 
shifting] recording would also be protected by the fair use doctrine”).  The Second Circuit also noted that 
another example may be when “[w]aiters at a restaurant sing “Happy Birthday” at a patron’s table.”  On 
Davis, 246 F.3d at 173.  But see Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that 
“every time you hear the ubiquitous refrain from “Happy Birthday” in a public performance, a subsidiary of 
AOL/TimeWarner cashes a royalty check”, at least until 2030 when it enters the public domain). 
36 See Ringgold, supra n. __ at 74, quoting Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1449, 1457 (1997).
37 See Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, Inc., 668 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1982).
38 See id. at 703.  But see Walker Manufacturing, Inc. v. Hoffman, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1066 
(N.D.Iowa 2003) (finding prototype of a sprayer intended for production and sale not a de minimis use of a 
copyright).
39 See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 914 F. Supp. 80, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding sales of 449 units and royalties 
in the amount of $2.22 to be sufficient to defeat a defense predicated upon de minimis non curat lex).  
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suggests that where the plaintiff has suffered no substantial harm from a violation of 
copyright, that plaintiff is not entitled to a remedy.40
The rationale behind applying the de minimis maxim to those insignificant or 
trivial violations of copyright is that some violations are simply not worth the time and 
effort of a lawsuit.  Because of the low social and judicial economy of such litigation, the 
law uses the de minimis doctrine to void causes of action in such cases. “When we do 
such things, it is not that we are breaking the law but unlikely to be sued given the high 
cost of litigation.  Because of the de minimis doctrine, in trivial instances of copying, we 
are in fact not breaking the law.”41
2.  SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
Even though it makes sense not to initiate a lawsuit for a relatively insignificant 
economic loss, economic damage is absent from the test for copyright infringement; the 
financial harm to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant is irrelevant when determining 
when the copyright of a work is actually infringed.42  Through the doctrine of substantial 
similarity, courts may apply the defense of de minimis non curat lex to focus upon the 
amount of the work infringed, not the amount of financial gain or loss.
Congress prescribed no test for copyright infringement in the Copyright Act.  
While, as noted supra, a creative work is "infringed" under the Copyright Act when 
anyone violates any of the exclusive rights reserved in the Act for the holder of the 
40 See Mihalek Corp. v. State of Michgan, 9 F.3d 1548 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding summary judgment for the 
defendant).
41 See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d at 173 (holding the de minimis doctrine inapplicable to 
plaintiff’s sunglasses in defendant’s advertisement because of the combination of circumstances).
42 See 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01.  
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copyright,43 the Act gives little guidance regarding the elements of infringement.  While 
other tests, such as the test for the defense of fair use (see infra), were expressly set out 
by Congress in the 1976 Copyright Act, courts were without Congressional guidance 
with respect to a statutory test for infringement and were left to rely upon precedent.  
Courts did not universally express, however, the need or desire for some kind of bright-
line test for copyright infringement.  As Judge Learned Hand commented, “The test for 
infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague….Decisions must [ ] inevitably be ad 
hoc….[O]ne cannot say how far an imitator must depart from an undeviating 
reproduction to escape infringement.”44
Absent a directive from Congress, courts have forged their own tests for copyright 
infringement, but again, without much guidance from obvious sources.  The clearest 
directive enunciated by the Supreme Court was when in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., Justice O’Connor wrote that “[t]o establish infringement, 
two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 
constituent elements of the work that are original.”45 The Court did not then expand upon 
this articulation of the test for copyright infringement, but instead focused almost entirely 
upon what made a constituent element of a copyrighted work original, leaving the circuit 
courts to interpret the application of the elements.46
43
 17 U.S.C. § 501.
44 See Peter Pan Fabrics, inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).  
45 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone & Telegraph, 499 U.S. 340 (1991), citing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
46 See id.
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Upon first read of the Feist test for infringement, an author might assume that her 
work was protected by a type of absolute liability against an infringer as long as she 
could provide a valid copyright certificate.  However, in order for copying to lead to 
infringement, the “copying must be actionable.”47 “Even where the fact of copying is 
conceded, no legal consequences can follow from that fact unless the copying is 
substantial.”48  Although all circuits have incorporated Feist’s two- prong test into their 
interpretations of copyright infringement, each tempers it with the notion of substantial
similarity, either as a test for unlawful copying49 or of probative similarity which, with 
evidence of access, gives rise to a circumstantial inference of copying.50  As a result, 
“[s]ubstantial similarity remains an indispensable element of plaintiff’s proof, even in 
cases…in which defendant does not contest factual copying.”51
a. Origins of the test
47 See 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[B].  See also Feist, supra n. __ at 361 (“Not all copying … is 
copyright infringement.”) (holding the copying of Rural’s white pages telephone directory entries not 
actionable copying because of lack of originality).
48 See 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A], quoting Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9 th Cir. 2003) 
(citing treatise).
49 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2005); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd, 273 F.3d 262, 268 
(2d Cir. 2001); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 1999); Incredible 
Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual Technologies, Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2005); Jacobsen v. Deseret 
Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 943 (10th Cir. 2002).  See also Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 
386 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that “substantial similarity is the test [the Eight Circuit uses] in 
determining copyright infringement,” but declining to apply it until the district court found a valid 
copyright interest).
50 See, e.g., Lyons Partnership, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001); Fogerty v. 
MGM Group Holdings Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2004); Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 
F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003); Calhoun v. Lillenas Publishing, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002).  See 
also Cottrill v. Spears, 87 Fed.Appx. 803, 807 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding it unnecessary to reach question of 
substantial similarity on summary judgment when plaintiffs failed to prove any access whatsoever).
51 See 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[B].
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The doctrine of substantial similarity in copyright law stems from the notion that 
not every instance of copying amounts to a misappropriation. In 1926, the Second 
Circuit stated that “the inquiry actually made [into copyright infringement] was always to 
ascertain what had been appropriated, if anything, and then decide whether the 
appropriation was (1) of copyrightable matter, and (2) was substantial,”52 without going 
much into what the sources of what had “always” been done were.
In the 1946 case of Arnstein v. Porter,53 the Second Circuit found a situation to 
clarify what it meant to constitute copyright infringement. In this case, plaintiff Arnstein 
alleged that Cole Porter's compositions infringed upon his works.54  Although there was 
no evidence of actual copying, the plaintiff asserted that Porter had access to the 
copyrighted works, either with the potential physical theft of the works from the plaintiff 
or by hearing the songs performed publicly on the radio.55  The defendant denied any 
thievery of or familiarity with the plaintiff’s works.
As Congress had not incorporated an explicit test for copyright infringement into 
the Copyright Act of 1909, the Second Circuit spelled out what it understood to be the 
test for copyright infringement:  copying plus illegal appropriation.  First, the court
52 See Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) (finding incorrect a test for infringement that first 
determined whether the theme of the play was similar, and then determine whether it had been 
appropriated).
53
 154 F. 2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (hereinafter “Arnstein”).
54 Id. at 467.  In particular, Arnstein alleged that Porter’s composition “Begin the Beguine” infringed upon 
his works “The Lord Is My Shepherd” and “A Mother’s Prayer”; that Porter’s song “My Heart Belongs to 
Daddy” infringed upon his work “A Mother’s Prayer”; that Porter’s song “I Love You Madly” infringed 
upon plaintiff’s “La Priere”; that Porter’s “Night and Day” infringed upon plaintiff’s unpublished, although 
once played over the radio, “I Love You Madly”; that Porter’s “You’d be So Nice To Come Home To” 
infringed plaintiff’s “Sadness Overwhelms My Soul”; and that Porter’s song “Don’t Fence Me In” 
infringed upon plaintiff’s unpublished and never publicly performed song, “A Modern Messiah.” 
 
55 Id. at 467 (plaintiff said that his “room had been ransacked on several occasions”).
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clarified that to show copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show that his work was 
copied.56 Copying on the part of the infringement defendant can be shown in one of two 
ways.  First, the defendant can admit that he copied the work.  Second, copying may be 
shown through circumstantial evidence.  This evidence consists of the defendant’s access 
to the copyrighted work and a similarity between the copyrighted work and defendant’s 
work which must be “so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant 
independently arrived at the same result,” as determined by experts or trained 
musicians.57 This analysis results in an imperfect inverse relationship between the two 
elements of circumstantial evidence of copying:  If the similarity between the works is 
striking very little access to the copyrighted work may be needed to constitute 
circumstantial evidence; however, if there is no similarity, no amount of access to the 
copyrighted work will establish that the defendant copied the work.58
If the plaintiff establishes copying, the court turns to the second prong of this test, 
unlawful appropriation.  For illegal copying to occur, “the copying … [must go so] far as 
to constitute improper appropriation.”59 This test is not one to be tested by experts, but 
the lay listener. The similarity necessary for this element need not rise to the level of the 
striking similarity required to establish copying.  Instead, it must be demonstrated 
whether “defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of 
lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that 
56 Id. at 468.
57 Id. at 468.  
58 Id. at 468 (“Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove 
copying.  If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine 
whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying.”).
59 Id. at 468.
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defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”60 In other 
words, if an audience of average listeners finds similarity between the first work and the 
second work, or that the two works are “inexcusably alike,”61 a finding of infringement 
may be proper. Although the Arnstein court did not use the phrase, it has been 
recognized that “the above-quoted statement in Arnstein was merely an alternative way of 
formulating the issue of substantial similarity.”62
The Arnstein court reversed a finding of summary judgment for the defendant 
because it was “unable to conclude that the likenesses are so trifling that, on the issue of 
misappropriation, a trial judge could legitimately direct a verdict for the defendant.”63
But it also admonished that it did not mean its decision to say that “a plagiarism case can 
never arise in which absence of similarities is so patent that a summary judgment for 
defendant would be correct.”64  In its reversal of a finding of summary judgment for the 
defendant, it noted that it had to do so because this statement by the Second Circuit 
suggests that there could be instances where likenesses are in fact so trifling that a trial 
judge could in fact legitimately direct a verdict for the defendant, and in fact, there have 
been cases where this has occurred.65
60Id. at 473.
61 Id. at 473.
62 See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Limited (Inc.), 360 F.2d 1021, 1023 n.2 (2d Cir. 1966).
63 Id. at 473.
64 Id. at 473.
65 See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912-913 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding two written works not 
substantially similar because neither mood, pace, nor sequence were alike nor was the infringement 
qualitatively or quantitatively important to either book); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 
720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding no substantial similarity between defendant’s “The Greatest 
American Hero” and plaintiff’s famous “Superman” program); Burns v. Frontline Gear, No. 00-CV-70916, 
2000 WL 1923514 at *2-3 (E.D.Mich. Nov 17, 2000) (finding no substantial similarity, and "a general 
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b. Substantial similarity and de minimis
The doctrine of substantial similarity is a natural extension for the doctrine of de 
minimis non curat lex.  “To establish that the infringement of a copyright is de minimis, 
and therefore not actionable, the alleged infringer must demonstrate that the copying of 
the protected material is so trivial ‘as to fall below the quantitative threshold of 
substantial similarity, which is always a required element of actionable copying.’”66 The 
de minimis doctrine has also been characterized as the “quantitative component” of 
substantial similarity, as opposed to “the copying of expression, rather than ideas, facts, 
works in the public domain, or any other non-protectable elements,”67 with some courts 
using it as a threshold inquiry before a full analysis of substantial similarity can be 
undertaken.68  However, this “quantitative component” can itself be evaluated 
quantitatively69 and qualitatively, as “[a] de minimis defense does not apply where the 
qualitative value of the copying is material”70 – rendering a de minimis analysis quite 
similar to the test for substantial similarity or the test for fair use.71
impression of similarity is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement," even in light of presumption 
of access for a well-known painting) (quoting Mihalek Corp. v Michigan, 814 F.2d 290(6th Cir.1987)). 
66 See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74).
67 See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(citing Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75); see also Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Systems, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 
1190 (D.Del. 1974), citing Mathews Conveyer Co .v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 84-85 (6th Cir. 1943) 
(“On the principle of de minimis non curat lex, it is necessary that a substantial part of the copyrighted 
work be taken.”).
68
 See Lynx Ventures, LLC v. Miller, 45 Fed. Appx. 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating denial of motion for 
preliminary injunction and remanding for consideration of substantial similarity where district court 
improperly found de minimis defense applicable).  
69
 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 138 (finding that copying of a few fragments from unrelated 
television programs may have met the de minimis doctrine, but that copying of 643 fragments from one 
series “crossed the quantitative copying threshold”). 
70 See Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. .v Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(finding 27 of 525,000 lines to be qualitatively significant, rendering the appropriation ineligible for the de 
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Because logically, a work cannot be substantially similar to a previous work 
without some degree of borrowing from the work before, most of the cases that discuss 
the de minimis defense at all discuss it in the context of the substantial similarity test for 
infringement.  One of the leading decisions to reestablish the maxim in the discourse of 
copyright law is the Second Circuit opinion in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment 
Television, Inc.72 In Ringgold, the plaintiff was an artist who specialized in quilts, putting 
together colorful and eye-catching pieces.  While she had authorized a poster of the quilt, 
she did not authorize Black Entertainment Television to use that poster featuring her quilt
in a television series, placing it in the background.  The quilt was shown on the screen for 
a total of 26.75 seconds of a half-hour television program.  The defendant argued that, 
even if its activity were infringement, it was too slight an infraction for the courts to 
become involved.
In disagreeing, the Second Circuit noted that the de minimis maxim can arise in 
copyright law in the three contexts stated above.  It stated the quantitative/qualitative 
components of substantial similarity, observing that while the qualitative component 
“often turns on the level of abstraction at which the works are compared,”73 the 
quantitative component concerns the amount copied.  In addition, because the work was a 
visual work, the quantitative component for substantial similarity – the de minimis
minimis defense).  See also Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 7109 (GEL), 2003 WL 
1787123 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2003) (finding that the defendants’ de minimis argument defective where 
what was copied was “a central and significant element of the copyrighted work”).
71
 The Third Circuit in Dun & Bradstreet cited Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 417 U.S. 
539 (1985) to suggest that the “highly critical” nature of the material taken made the de minimis test 
inapplicable.  Harper & Row deals with the amount used in a fair use context, while Dun & Bradstreet did 
not discuss fair use.
72
 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
73 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75.
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maxim74 it was necessary that the copied work be “observable in the allegedly infringing 
work and such factors as focus, lighting, camera angles, and prominence.”75  While the 
Ringgold court did not find the copying to be de minimis, the Second Circuit has used the 
“average lay observer” test to find insufficient copying to deem any infringing activity 
actionable; in Sandoval v. New Line Cinema,76 the Second Circuit, found that the display 
of photographs as part of the movie “Seven” was subject to the de minimis doctrine, 
finding that the “photographs as used in the movie are not displayed with sufficient detail 
for the average lay observer to identify even the subject matter of the photographs, much 
less the style used in creating them.”77
While the “observability” test does not translate perfectly into other works, such 
as music, the tests are not difficult to transpose.  Whereas visual or pictorial works must 
not be sufficient for the average lay observer to distinguish the original work, it has been 
held in musical compositions that “a use is de minimis only if the average audience 
would not recognize the appropriation.”78 “To say that a use is de minimis because no 
audience would recognize the appropriation is thus to say that the use is not sufficiently 
significant.”79  Unlike copying of visual works, where the likelihood of finding copyright 
infringement lessens when a work is blurred or obscured from view, decisions regarding 
74
 126 F. 3d at 75 (“Since ‘substantial similarity,’ properly understood, includes a quantitative component, 
it becomes apparent why the concept of de minimis is relevant to a defendant’s contention that an 
indisputably copied work has not been infringed.”).  
75
 126 F. 3d at 75.
76
 147 F. 3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998).
77 Id. at 218.  See also Gordon v. Nextel Communications, 345 F. 3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding no 
infringement where the illustration used is never in focus and appears only as distant background).
78 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F. 3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 
79 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F. 3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003).
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de minimis appropriations of musical compositions note that the work need not be 
completely obscured, but may under the doctrine of fragmented literal similarity copy 
exactly without copying substantial elements.80
Regardless of the format of the work, certain constants have emerged regarding 
the application of the de minimis doctrine when it is used as a part of a court’s substantial 
similarity analysis.  First, the concept of whether or not a work has quantitative similarity 
is a subjective analysis; “there are no bright line rules…and the issue must be decided 
case by case.”81 There is no “strict arithmetical formula”82 that has been applied, 
although courts have attempted to fashion a type of rule by reviewing contributions to 
works that other entities consider to merit value.83 This suggests that it would be 
impossible to create a bright-line rule for de minimis, except to rule it out altogether, 
which negates the purpose of the doctrine and contradicts the second observation: even in 
the face of undisputed copying, it is possible to employ the de minimis defense, with the 
result of a copying that is undisputed but non-infringing.84
Third, a test for whether an amount of copying can meet the low threshold beyond 
which the de minimis doctrine may be applied involves the perceptions of the “average” 
observer.  This is true whether the work is literary or musical, visual or aural.  This 
80 See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003), citing 4 Nimmer § 13.03 [A][2] at 13-45.  
For a full discussion of fragmented literal similarity, see 4 Nimmer § 13.03[A][2]; see also Leslie A. Kurtz, 
The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 429, 441-445 (1986).
81 See Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., Silberman v. Innovation Luggage, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 7109 
(GEL), 2003 WL 1787123 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2003). 
82 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d 768, 779 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
83 See Gordon v. Nextel Communications, 345 F. 3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (considering three-second 
“background or montage” display for royalty rate for published and pictorial works as instructive for de 
minimis determination).
84 See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75.
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“average observer” test gives rise to the fourth constant:  despite the quantitative nature 
of the de minimis doctrine, a qualitative component must be employed to determine 
whether the quantity taken constitutes a qualitatively significant amount.  
The final two observations are procedural.  Despite isolated decisions to the 
contrary,85 the question of de minimis copying can be resolved by the trial court on 
summary judgment, even though the amount copied is a question of fact.86 Finally, it is 
appropriate to evaluate whether the infringement satisfied the de minimis defense as a 
part of the “quantitative threshold of substantial similarity” before evaluating it as a 
potential part of the fair use defense.87
3. FAIR USE 
Even though courts generally recognize that a de minimis defense must first be 
considered in its economic sense and in the sense of substantial similarity,88 the only 
Congressional implementation of the maxim de minimis non curat lex is in the test for the 
fair use of a copyrighted material.  The statutory test of fair use – the justified use of a 
copyrighted work for which purpose is not infringement89 – embodies the quantitative 
similarity that the de minimis defense requires, although courts apply the fair use defense 
differently and subjectively.  Although expressly stated in the Copyright Act that an 
85 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d 768, 779 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (denying 
summary judgment and finding both quantitative and qualitative de minimis analysis to be questions of 
fact).
86 See, e.g., Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 9 F.3d 1548 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment while 
relying in part on defense of de minimis non curat lex).  The importance of the ability to use summary 
judgment becomes more evident when determining whether there are suitable alternatives to the de minimis
defense, infra.
87 See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, 147 F. 3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998).
88 See Sandoval, 147 F. 3d at 217; Bridgeport, 383 F.3d at 394.
89
 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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activity deemed fair use does not constitute infringement of copyright,90 courts and 
authorities have considered fair use a defense to an act of infringement, not as a negation 
of the infringement itself.91
Because copyright grants a monopoly over written and oral expression, copyright 
law has been perceived to be at odds with the First Amendment principles of free press 
and free speech.92  Exceptions to copyright infringement to protect those principles are 
codified in the Copyright Act as the test for fair use, which states in its preamble that a 
use that is “fair” will be “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching…, scholarship, or research….”93 Congress then clarified a four-part test for fair 
use, determining that the four factors applicable to such a determination are: 
(1) the purpose and character of the [second] use…; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion [of the copyrighted 
work] used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the [second] use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.94
Because the third factor suggests that the fair use test should apply if the amount 
of the copyrighted work is small, it would appear that the Copyright Act preserves the 
90
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work…is not an infringement of copyright.”).  “A 
privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner 
without the owner’s consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 6th ed. 
91 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985) (discussing a factor 
that would “negate a defense of fair use”).
92 See generally Henry S. Hoberman, Copyright and the First Amendment:  Freedom or Monopoly of 
Expression?,14 Pepp. L. Rev. 571 (March 1987).  But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) 
(finding that because of the temporal proximity of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, “in the 
Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles”).
93
 17 U.S.C. § 107.  See also John C. Knapp, Laugh, and the Whole World . . . Scowls at You?: A Defense 
of the United States’ Fair Use Exception for Parody Under TRIPS, 33 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 347, 348 
(Spring 2005).
94
 17 U.S.C § 107.
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spirit of the de minimis defense within fair use and that a separate defense need not apply.  
Indeed, it has been observed that “[t]he doctrine of fair use has been described as being a 
‘partial marriage’ to the maxim de minimis non curat lex.”95 Certain courts have used the 
terms interchangeably, suggesting that if a work is found not to be fair use, the de 
minimis defense cannot apply.  Others have considered it not in connection with the 
amount used, but on the economic effect of such a use, blending the effect of the de 
minimis doctrine with the fourth factor as well.96
III. PERCEIVED LIMITATIONS OF THE DE MINIMIS DEFENSE IN 
COPYRIGHT
The de minimis defense to copyright infringement has been explored at length by 
the common law and codified in statute, but by nature the doctrine has limitations to its 
application.  An appropriation of any economic, quantitative or qualitative value removes 
the possibility of a de minimis defense from a second comer.  Recently, however, a Sixth 
Circuit decision – while not entirely credible – has suggested additional limitations to the 
de minimis defense, to the point of inapplicability.  In particular, it attempted to curtail
the de minimis defense with respect to the infringement of sound recordings, one of two 
copyrights available to any single piece of recorded music.97  This issue has proven to be 
problematic with the practice of music sampling, “the act of taking a portion of one sound 
95 See Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 9 F.3d 1548 (6th Cir. 1993), citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 n.34 (1984) (quoting Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted in 
Study No. 14 for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revision, Studies Prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 (1960)).  However, it is 
unclear that this “partial marriage” was intended to fall within a full fair use analysis or was instead 
discussing the economic justification, as it is predicated by the clause, “In certain situations, the copyright 
owner suffers no substantial harm from the use of the work.”  Id.
96 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1539 (C.D. Cal. 1985) 
(citing de minimis maxim and “partial marriage” quotation with respect to economic effect).
97
 The other copyright is a copyright in the composition itself, which customarily is awarded the songwriter.
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recording and reusing it as an instrument or elements of a new recording.”98 Because 
samples often involve fewer than five notes or less than ten seconds of the copyrighted 
sound recording and intended audiences may or may not recognize the work sampled in 
the second work, the practice of sampling should prompt courts to question whether the 
de minimis defense might be applicable to sound recordings to permit this practice.  
A. Sound recordings 
The recent decision of Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (hereinafter 
“Bridgeport”)99 raised issues with respect to the statutory treatment of sound recordings 
and found no viable application of the de minimis defense for this particular medium of 
copyrighted expression.  
1. Bridgeport v. Dimension
The copyrighted work in Bridgeport involved the recording “Get Off Your Ass 
and Jam” by George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics.  The song opens with a three-note 
combination solo guitar “riff” lasting four seconds.  The artists Ruthless Attack Muzick 
and Dollarz N Sense Music copied a two-second sample from “Get Off Your Ass and 
Jam,” lowered the pitch, looped the sample, and extended it to sixteen beats lasting 
approximately seven seconds.  The sample was included five times in rap artists NWA’s 
song “100 Miles and Runnin’,” which in turn was included in the 93-minute movie I Got 
the Hook Up, released by defendant No Limit Films (“No Limit”).  Plaintiffs Bridgeport 
Music, Inc., which owned the musical composition copyright, and Westbound Records, 
Inc., which owned the sound recording copyright, sued No Limit for infringement based 
98 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki.
99
 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
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on the sample.  After the District Court granted summary judgment against Bridgeport,100
No Limit moved for summary judgment against Westbound, arguing “the sample was 
legally insubstantial and therefore does not amount to actionable copying.”101  The U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to No 
Limit as well.
One of the primary issues taken to the Court of Appeals was the issue of 
application of the de minimis defense to the defendants’ infringing activity. Following 
established precedent, the district court made it clear that “the de minimis analysis was a 
derivation of the substantial similarity element when a defendant claims that the literal 
copying of a small and insignificant portion of the copyrighted work should be 
allowed,”102 as opposed to contributing to a small and significant portion of the new use.  
Applying the substantial similarity test and the de minimis defense, the district court 
found the use of the song “did not ‘rise to the level of a legally cognizable 
appropriation.’”103 The Sixth Circuit disagreed.  Using a “literal reading” statutory 
analysis, the Sixth Circuit found that sound recordings were ineligible for the substantial 
similarity test dictated by Arnstein v. Porter and its progeny.104
100
 Bridgeport entered into an agreement with Ruthless Attack Muzick and Dollarz N Sense in December 
1998, granting a sample use oral synchronization license to use “Get Off Your Ass and Jam.”  This license 
extended to the artists’ licensees.  Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796.
101 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 797.  No Limit also argued that the sample was not original enough to be 
protected by copyright law.  The district court found the sample original, and No Limit did not appeal that 
determination.
102 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 797-798.
103 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 830, 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
104 The Sixth Circuit was not forced into taking this approach and had ample support for the opposite 
finding.  The bottom line of this opinion – that the de minimis defense is inapplicable in certain instances –
is contrary to very recent precedent from its own circuit involving substantial similarity in the film industry.  
In Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004), the plaintiff sued the producer of the film 
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2. Interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114
The “literal reading” which the Sixth Circuit undertook was of 17 U.S.C. § 114, 
which governs the protection of sound recordings under the Copyright Act.  Since 1971, 
“sound recordings” have received a different treatment than most forms of media in 
which a copyrighted work may be fixed.  By definition:
“Sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a 
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the 
sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, 
tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.105
Primarily, section 114 serves to limit the application of the section 106 rights
which are not expressly reserved for sound recordings.106 Section 114 expressly 
(1) excludes the rights of public display and public performance altogether;107 (2) limits 
the right of copying or reproduction “to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the 
form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds 
fixed in the recording;”108 (3) limits the right to make derivative works to “the right to 
prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are 
“Little Nicky” for infringing on his screenplay “The Keeper.”  When upholding the district court’s entry of 
summary judgment for the defendant, the Sixth Circuit enunciated its version of the two-part Arnstein test.  
The first part “involves determining which parts of the plaintiff’s work are protected by copyright; the 
second part involves whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the protectible 
elements.”  According to this test, a prerequisite to a finding of infringement must be that the “ordinary, 
reasonable observer would find the works, taken as a whole, to be substantially similar.”  Id. at 294.
105
 17 U.S.C. § 101.
106
 As noted above, only the right to perform digitally pertains only to sound recordings.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106.
107
 17 U.S.C. § 114(a).
108
 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
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rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality;”109 and (4) does not 
limit or impair the right to perform a sound recording digitally.110
a. Right to reproduce
Read literally, as the Sixth Circuit did, section 114 could be interpreted to dispose 
of the de minimis defense and substantial similarity in connection with sound recordings.   
The right to reproduce the sound recording makes it a violation of copyright to “duplicate 
the sound recording” in a copy that “directly or indirectly recapture[s] the actual sounds 
fixed in the recording.”111  As with all of copyright law, this language is up for 
interpretation.  If the interpreter focuses on “actual sounds fixed in the recording,” it is 
possible that the interpretation will lead to the result that a duplication of any of the 
sounds in a recording would be in automatic violation of section 114.
This “literal reading” may not be in fact what Congress intended, and may not 
even be a literal reading of the Copyright Act.  The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that it 
was announcing a new rule, and that it believed the best policy was a straightforward 
rule, even if such a rule was found nowhere else in copyright law:  
The music industry, as well as the courts, are best served if 
something approximating a bright-line test can be established.  Not 
necessarily a “one size fits all” test, but one that, at least, adds 
clarity to what constitutes actionable infringement with regard to 
the digital sampling of copyrighted sound recordings.112
109 Id.
110
 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(4).  The remainder of the section applies to further limitations regarding sound 
transmissions, statutory licensing of transmissions, and royalties.
111
 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
112 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 799.
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Yet the Sixth Circuit proceeded to dictate the “one size fits all” test that it purported it 
was not doing.  Touting ease of enforcement, market controls, and willfulness on the part 
of the sampling infringer, the Bridgeport court stood by its decision wholeheartedly, 
hiding behind the statute as dictating its actions, finding that taking a sample was “a 
physical taking rather than an intellectual one.”113
However, this interpretation is faulty because it does not consider the entire 
meaning of the statute.  It is a violation of the right of reproduction to “duplicate the 
sound recording,” defined as the “…work[] that result[s] from the fixation of … 
sounds.”114  The statute does not suggest that the “work” consists of a trivial amount of
the sounds in the fixation but of the entire fixed work.  This interpretation is consistent 
with the legislative history of section 114, which suggests that the purpose behind the 
section was to prevent compilers from creating “greatest hits” compilations without the 
consent of the initial recorder.115
This is not to say that the reproduction right of a sound recording cannot be 
violated with any less than a full copy of the work.  That would render sound recordings 
more vulnerable than any other medium protected by copyright, when they have already 
been considerably limited by the language of section 114 in the first place.  It does, 
however, mean that sound recordings are subject to the same interpretation as any other 
work fixed in any other medium of tangible expression, which was intended by 
113 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
114
 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(b), 101.
115 See H.R. Rep. 92-487, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567 (discussing “[t]he pirating of records and tapes”).
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Congress.116 This would mean that sound recordings are subject to the same test for 
copyright infringement – originality plus copying (access plus misappropriation, 
demonstrated through substantial similarity).  Additionally, this interpretation renders 
sound recordings subject to the defense of de minimis non curat lex, as are other 
media.117
Moreover, legislative history behind section 114 of the Copyright Act establishes 
that an inquiry into substantial similarity is warranted in instances of infringement of 
sound recordings.  It is clear from the notes of the Committee on the Judiciary that it was 
not the intent of Congress to do away with a substantial similarity test for sound 
recordings or to impose a strict liability standard on their use.  The Committee noted that 
“... infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds 
that go to make up the copyrighted sound recording are reproduced.”118 This language 
suggests that, even in actual reproduction, the portion of the sounds reproduced had to be 
substantial, easily interpreted as Congress’ allusion to the substantial similarity test.119
Why this rejection of a reasoned approach based on common law, rather than the 
sudden imposition of a hard and fast rule?  Practically speaking, the Sixth Circuit could 
have been saving itself judicial nuisance in future months.  As the decision points out, 
Bridgeport Music and its related entities had alleged “nearly 500 counts against 
approximately 800 defendants … relating to the use of samples without permission in 
116 See H.R. Rep. 92-487, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572 (“[I]t is the intention of the Committee that this 
limited copyright not grant any broader rights than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under the 
existing title 17.”).
118
 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rep. No. 94-1476 (emphasis added).
119
 The fact that this language was not included in the final statute is not important; section 114 does not 
include a definition of what substantial similarity is.
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new rap recordings.”120  Obviously, anticipating a slew of copyright infringement cases 
based on sampling – the Sixth Circuit noted “hundreds of other cases all involving 
different samples from different songs”121 – it would be much more prudent to hand 
down a rule that gives the district court a finding of automatic infringement upon copying 
than it would to require a case-by- case subjective analysis of each individual set of 
circumstances, despite the Sixth Circuit’s protestations that “considerations of judicial 
economy are not what drives this opinion.”122
b. Right to create derivative works
Had the Sixth Circuit undertaken a stronger interpretation of the derivative works 
right, it may have had an easier and potentially correct justification for denying summary 
judgment to defendant No Limit.  The interpretation of the derivative works right less 
clearly favors the ability of second comers to sample sound recordings, or perhaps even 
apply the de minimis defense.  A derivative work is “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works...in any [ ] form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.”123 Again, the language of section 114 seems to abolish any hope of substantial 
similarity or a de minimis analysis, because in addition to the entire work, it reserves to 
the author of the sound recording any derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in 
120 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795.
121 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
122 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.  The Sixth Circuit, however, has a tendency to forego a de minimis analysis 
whenever doing so would contravene express language in a statute, even when doing so would make better 
common sense. In interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Sixth Circuit held the Act to be 
“‘extraordinarily broad’ and must be enforced as written, even when eminently sensible exceptions are 
proposed in the face of innocent and/or de minimis violations.” See Hartman v. Asset Acceptance 
Corporation, No. 1:03-cv-113, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24845 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2004), citing Frey v. 
Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521 (6th Cir. 1992).
123
 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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the sound recording are “rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or 
quality,”124 which may seem to preclude any use of any portion of the work whatsoever 
in works that are not the original sound recording.
This interpretation, however, is also flawed, or at least is too simplistic.  
According to a statutory interpretation, the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording 
must be “rearranged, remixed, or altered in sequence or quality.”  If a second-comer 
borrows a short phrase from a sound recording – for example, a three-note sequence –
those notes have not been rearranged, with respect to one another.  Neither have they 
been altered in sequence or quality, if the sounds have been merely transposed from one 
work to another later work.  The notes could possibly have been said to have been 
“remixed,” as some definitions of the word “remix” includes short phrases of notes that 
have been truly reproduced.  However, a popular definition of “remix” is “an alternate 
mix of a song different from the original version... often used to create an upbeat version 
of a song for playing by disc jockeys in nightclubs.”125  In other words, remixing is 
generally used to refer to taking an entire sound recording and overlaying it with a 
different beat or genre.  If the notes have not been tampered with, a “remix” may not 
have occurred.
If Congress had intended for derivative works to include purely reproduced 
sounds, why not include the words “a portion” of the sounds in a sound recording in the 
right of reproduction?  Instead, Congress left courts with language that was ambiguous 
124
 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
125 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki.
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and subject to interpretation, instead of clarifying the language when it got the chance in 
the 1976 Copyright Act.
However, this ambiguity explains where the de minimis doctrine could be useful 
to ensure uniformity within the same category of work.  The de minimis doctrine applies 
equally to the rights to reproduce and the derivative works right.  Under the “literal 
meaning” test of the Sixth Circuit, it seems that the district court did improperly grant
summary judgment to defendant No Limit, because a “remixing” did in fact occur.  This 
is where the possibility of a de minimis test is not only necessary, but mandatory.  The 
“remixed” sample used in “100 Miles” involved lowering the pitch, and “no reasonable 
juror, even one familiar with the works of George Clinton, would recognize the source of 
the sample without having been told of its source.”126  However, a sound recording where 
no alterations occur for the music but merely sample directly from the music, under a 
literal reading of section 114 of the Copyright Act, may not give rise to an infringement 
action, even if the average audience can recognize the source of the sample, causing 
potential unfairness in its treatment.
3.  Illustration: Harry Potter and the Three-Second Crime
To illustrate that the suggestion that a court should not be mindful of the de 
minimis defense merely because the medium presented is a sound recording is illogical, 
consider the problem of a book that is recorded in audio format.  When the book is 
written, the copyright initially vests with the author of the book.  Because it is in book 
format, according to the Copyright Act, the author receives the individual rights to copy, 
126 See Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798.
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to make derivative works, to distribute, to perform, and to display the book.127 A person 
reading the book for fixation on a compact disc or audiocassette tape does not
automatically receive a copyright in the performance; that copyright still belongs to the 
author of the book, but is licensed to the reader so that the reader may perform the work
in a derivative work.  The performer will receive a thin copyright in just the performance, 
so long as the performance is recorded in a tangible medium of expression.  That fixation 
can be created by the performer himself, or the task can be licensed to a third person.  
“The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not always, 
involve ‘authorship’ both on the part of the performers whose performance is captured 
and on the part of the record producer responsible for setting up the recording session, 
capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to 
make the final sound recording.”128 The producer then becomes the “author” of a thin 
copyright over the sound recording itself.129  The copyright of the sound recording is 
owned by Random House Publishing, Inc.
With these multiple levels of authorship, whose rights, then, are infringed when a 
person takes a few words from the audio recording and incorporates them into a later 
developed song or audio presentation?  For instance, the Harry Potter children’s book 
series by author J.K. Rowling, including the initial volume Harry Potter and the 
127
 17 U.S.C. § 106.
128 See H.R. Rep. 92-487, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1569.
129
 Of course, this is assuming the existence of permissions from all and the absence of licenses or other 
contracts to keep the copyrights.  While the author realizes that these licenses and permissions would exist 
in the real world – and, in fact, most rights would simply be owned by TimeWarner and a question of 
ownership or creativity would be moot – the author asks the reader to engage in her own variety of fiction.
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Sorcerer's Stone, has sold more than 270 million copies130 in 62 languages.131 In 
addition, the first five audio books in the series have sold more than 4 million copies in 
North America, thanks in large part to the creativity of reader Jim Dale.132
Suppose rapper DJ Julie J creates a commercial rap song for kids, “Listen Up and 
Read!”  The song includes a snippet from the Sorcerer’s Stone book as it was read by 
Dale.  The snippet consists only of Dale’s spoken words, “Harry, Ron, and Hermione,” a 
four-word phrase which appears a number of times in the text and lasting 2.5 second on 
the audio book,133 but amounts to a negligible percentage of the 309-page text as a 
whole.134
If DJ Julie J does not receive any authorization to create the song before creating 
it, she could be infringing the creative rights of the authors of previous works.  But who 
would be able to recover? J.K. Rowling has created six books, dozens of characters, and 
hundreds of scenes in the Harry Potter series.  As the author of the text, Rowling has the 
rights which a copyright confers.  However, if a court performs a true de minimis 
analysis, four words from a text more than three hundred pages may amount to a use that 
is insubstantial, although the source of their appropriation may be apparent to the average 
observer, if the audience is comprised of school children previously exposed to the Harry 
130 See T K Arun, “Harry Potter, globalising wizard,” Economic Times (India) (July 21, 2005).
131 See Meg Milne, “Just wild about Harry,” Express on Sunday (UK) (May 15, 2005).
132 See Merrill Balassone, “Dale Makes Sound Contribution to Potter Books,” Los Angeles Times (August 
9, 2005).
133 See J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone, pp. 192, 235, and 266.  Harry Potter, Ron 
Weasley, and Hermione Granger are the main pre-adult characters in Rowling’s Harry Potter series.
134
 Given a value of approximately 250 words per page, this would amount to 77,250 words; the percentage 
of the original work actually taken would thus be 0.02% if all four instances of the words were taken as a 
percentage, 0.005% if only one instance is used as the basis.
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Potter books .  Considering only the amount of the book taken, DJ Julie J could raise a 
defense of de minimis use, and it is likely that she could succeed.
Jim Dale, although his creative contribution to the Harry Potter series has 
included more than 200 distinct voices – including 134 in Harry Potter and the Order of 
the Phoenix135 – has only a thin copyright with few rights to enforce, the rights in the 
performance.  Dale would be able to bring an action to enforce his Section 106 rights.
However, again, if a court performs the de minimis analysis, four words from an eight-
CD series – at most 12 seconds total – is quite insubstantial, and the source of their 
appropriation may be less apparent to the average observer.  Moreover, the amount of 
creativity that Dale put into those particular words is less than if he were acting out a 
character, as they are by necessity spoken in as plain a narrative voice as possible.136
Again, considering only the amount of the book taken, DJ Julie J could raise a defense of 
de minimis use, and it is likely that she could succeed.  
In addition to a de minimis defense, assuming that “Listen Up and Read!” is a 
commercial-length song (which averages approximately three minutes), the infringement 
may be insufficient to rise to the level of substantial similarity. However, even though 
the doctrines of de minimis non curat lex and substantial similarity would likely prevent 
either Dale or Rowling from recovering under traditional copyright infringement, if the 
Sixth Circuit’s Bridgeport decision is permitted to stand, Random House – which merely 
employed the producer, who performed the technical task of fixing Dale’s voice onto a 
135 See Merrill Balassone, “Dale Makes Sound Contribution to Potter Books,” Los Angeles Times (August 
9, 2005).  The number earned Dale a place in the Guinness Word Book of Records for the most voices in a 
single audio book.  Id.
136
 The words “Harry, Ron and Hermione” generally apply to text which describes a particular event; this 
author has not yet found whether they appear in any character’s dialogue.  
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compact disc – could have a viable cause of action against DJ Julie J.  Compared to the 
creative efforts of J.K. Rowling and Jim Dale in creating the Sorcerer’s Stone storyline 
and performance intriguing enough to captivate an audience of millions, the amount of 
creativity contributed by the corporate entity that fixes the performance onto a compact 
disc is negligible – indeed, a de minimis amount.  However, in this bizarre distinction 
between sound recordings and the rest of the creative world, it is the only entity that has 
an ironclad chance of recovery.137
The Harry Potter illustration above demonstrates that the application of a test that 
includes infringement without any possibility of a de minimis defense merely because the 
copyrighted work is a sound recording can be preposterous, leading to results that are 
both inequitable and nonsensical.  Under the Copyright Act, the interpretation of the 
rights afforded a sound recording for a musical work is no different than the rights 
afforded a sound recording for a written work, and may in fact present a stronger 
argument for a test for infringement that depends upon the reaction of listeners. The need 
for an audience is paramount in music and sampling cases; it has been noted that “artists 
require an audience for relevance.”138  If in fact the existence of an audience is important 
to the author of a particular medium of a copyrighted work, it is logical that the 
infringement of that work should be determined using the audience-sensitive test of de 
minimis.  And, since the manner in which that has been accomplished to date has been 
through the application of some form of test for substantial similarity, which relies on the 
137
 This is not to say that the sound recording artists can never have the same degree of creativity as the 
performer or the writer, author or composer of the underlying work.  It is also possible that the individual 
author of the underlying work will retain the copyrights to all derivative works, which is fully within her 
rights.   However, given the expense that goes into creating a marketable sound recording, it is more likely 
that the owner of the sound recording will be a corporate entity than an individual.
138
 Kenneth M. Achenbach, 6 N.C.J.L. & Tech. 187, 195 (Fall 2004).  
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lay audience to determine not the scope but the existence of infringement, the Sixth 
Circuit’s blanket disregard for substantial similarity or a de minimis test is not only 
improper but reckless.
B. Application Beyond Sound Recordings
Much of the emphasized protection for sound recordings relies on the 
technological medium in which the recordings are necessarily fixed.  Even though untrue 
when Congress authored section 114 of the Copyright Act,139 with current technology, it 
is easier to copy a sound recording and to create a derivative work using parts of that 
sound recording.
However, the sound recording is not the only work that has been impacted by a 
technological improvement in the medium of fixation. More than ever, written materials 
are available in a format that makes the ease of copying considerable.  As in music, the 
problem of direct, total reproduction has increased exponentially.  However, with the 
exception of the additional protections afforded by the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act140 to an already-fixed work, nothing has been done to afford digital copies of the 
same work an additional copyright or a higher standard based solely on the medium of 
the work.
The abolition of substantial similarity or the de minimis defense with respect to 
sound recordings sets a dangerous precedent for these works, as well as for copyrighted 
works for which there exists only a small amount of originality.  An example of this 
inherent danger is illustrated with a compilation or database.  As in sound recordings, 
139
 In 1971, the primary medium on which to record sounds was “16-track 2-inch tape, mixed down to ¼-
inch, and without using computers.”  See Paul Tingen, “John Frusciante's Creative Explosion,” 21 
Electronic Musician at 64 (Issue 1, January 2005).
140
 17 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
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Congress went to great lengths to define the scope of the rights afforded a compilation.  
A copyright in a compilation may protect the author’s “selection, coordination and 
arrangement,” but does not afford any protection to the underlying information.141 Thus, 
the “preexisting materials or data” that are selected, coordinated or arranged in a 
compilation, as defined by statute, are not protectable by copyright.142  As clarified by the 
Supreme Court in Feist, “… facts are not copyrightable; … compilations of facts 
generally are.”143 As a result, the copyright afforded is “thin.”144
Admittedly, the current scope of protection for a database is narrow, but it is not 
nonexistent; and it is possible to interpret the appropriation of a small amount of the data 
in a database as infringement. While the language of the existing statute would likely 
mandate against a finding of infringement in all but the most extreme of cases, such 
judicial consideration may be taken into account when crafting an American version of 
the European Union Database Directive (the “Directive”),145 which affords increased 
rights to the creators of databases. For a substantial investment in a database, the author 
can prevent a party from extracting substantial amounts of the data from the database and 
reutilizing the data in its own product.146 An extraction is the “permanent or temporary 
transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another medium by any 
141 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (2005) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
142 17 U.S.C. §101 (2005).
143Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 499 U.S. at 344.
144 Id. at 344.
145 Council Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 39 [hereinafter Database Directive].
146 See id. at art. 7 § 2, art. 10 § 1.
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means or in any form;”147 a reutilization is “any form of making available to the public all 
or a substantial part of the contents of a database by the distribution of copies, by renting, 
by on- line or other forms of transmission.”148
The amount of the database appropriated is highly relevant to the Directive, 
because the creator has a cause of action when an infringer appropriates a portion of the 
database contents that is substantial quantitatively or qualitatively.  If a very small 
portion of the database contents – even if it only amounts to one piece of data – is of 
great commercial value (or great potential commercial value), or if an insubstantial part 
of the database is repeatedly extracted or reutilized, it is possible under the Directive to 
have a qualitative extraction or reutilization.149
The Directive does not directly affect the rights of American authors, because it 
does not offer reciprocal rights to those creators who are citizens of countries that do not 
recognize a database right.  Perhaps as a result, since the Directive was enacted in 1996, 
the House of Representatives has had legislation on the calendar purporting to grant a sui
generis right or a super-copyright for databases in each session except one. The 
probability of a new statutory “information property right” may increase with the recent 
creation of an “intellectual property czar” in the House of Representatives Energy and 
Commerce Committee.  
Without the possibility of a de minimis defense, or at least the specific delineation 
of what constitutes “extraction” or “reutilization” in a new database right, copyright law 
147 Id. at art. 7 §2(a).
148 Id. at art. 7 § 2(b).
149 See id. at art. 7 § 1.
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runs the risk of contradicting itself.  First, it is possible that there could be an intellectual 
property right in facts, which is expressly impermissible in the Copyright Act.150
Moreover, the elimination of a de minimis defense or substantial similarity threshold for 
copying creates a right in a database that runs perilously close to running afoul of the 
First Amendment freedoms of speech and of the press by giving database creators 
potential monopolies over individual data on a strict liability basis.
C. Strict Liability in Copyright?
That gives rise to yet another perceived potential limitation of the de minimis test 
in copyright infringement: the mistaken belief that copyright infringement is in fact a tort 
rooted in strict liability, “liability without fault.”151  This is contrary to both the original 
philosophy behind copyright and the intent of the legislature, as evidenced most recently 
in the Copyright Act of 1976.  This is faulty for two primary reasons.  First, copyright 
infringement is not in fact subject to a strict liability analysis.  Second, even if copyright 
could be considered to be within the parameters of strict liability, the fact that a statute 
provides for strict liability does not preclude the application of the de minimis defense in 
certain instances of trivial violations.
1. Application of Strict Liability to Copyright 
Historically, strict liability has not been used in copyright infringement to negate 
a de minimis defense.  The blanket statement “[s]trict liability has long been a part of 
Anglo-American copyright law,” espoused by scholars to suggest that even the innocent 
infringer will be held accountable for copyright infringement, has not historically applied 
150
 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
151
 Black’s Law Dictionary
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to determine whether or not an act of copying is substantial enough to constitute 
infringement in the first place.152  When taking on this viewpoint, scholars cite what they 
perceive to be the Feist test for infringement of a copyright – “ownership of a valid 
copyright, and copying of ‘constituent elements of the work that are original’” –
discussed supra.153 This paper has already pointed out the problems with applying the 
test that Feist mandates  without considering the additional requirements of substantial 
similarity.
However, even those who find “longstanding traditions” of strict liability question 
its existence in connection with copyright infringement, noting that “the culpability of the 
infringer has long been an important factor in assessing liability.”154 The age-old 
common law that has dealt with copyright infringement does not suggest that strict 
liability has an equation with any instance of copying, or that any degree of copying gives 
rise to an automatic finding of infringement.
In fact, the application of strict liability in copyright common law has been 
relatively recent, introduced primarily in terms of secondary liability  for copyright 
infringement.  In the 1984 opinion Sony v. Universal Studios,155 the Supreme Court 
legitimized the concept of secondary liability when it considered whether the 
manufacturers of videocassette recorders (VCRs) were liable to the entertainment 
industry for any acts of copyright infringement that the consumers of VCRs committed 
152 See Dane S. Ciolino and Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 
351, 355 (Winter 2002).
153 Id., citing Feist.
154 See Ciolino, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. at 359.
155 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78 L. Ed. 2d 
574 (1984).
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with respect to copyrighted works.  Although the Court ultimately held that the 
manufacturers were not liable, the decision gave additional credence to the concept of 
secondary liability.
Courts since the decision in Sony v. Universal have begun to hold, albeit 
sporadically, that the incorporation of secondary liability suggests that copyright is 
indeed a strict liability statute.  Citing no case precedent but several law review articles, 
courts have made the blanket statement that "copyright is a strict liability statute," and 
therefore instances of copying on the part of a direct infringer could give rise to 
automatic liability on the part of the secondary infringer.156
Yet this drastic increase in culpability has yet to curry favor with the majority of 
courts, including the Supreme Court.  The June 2005 Supreme Court decision MGM v. 
Grokster157 dealt specifically with contributory and vicarious infringement on the part of 
a peer-to-peer file sharing service.  The Supreme Court considered whether the courts 
below could properly enter summary judgment favoring the defendants based on the 
traditional secondary liability tests – direct infringement, financial benefit and control of 
the infringer, for vicarious liability; direct infringement, knowledge of the infringement 
and substantial participation, for contributory liability.158  Instead of suggesting that any 
infringement was subject to a strict liability analysis, the Supreme Court crafted an 
additional level of analysis that courts must consider in addition to the tests: one of the 
156 See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D.Fla.1993) (finding an Internet service 
provider strictly liable); disagreed with by CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, (4th Cir. 
2004).
157 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., – U.S. – , 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2779 (2005).
158 See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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intent of the potential secondary infringer.159  This suggests that even the Supreme Court 
considers copyright infringement not to be a tort of true strict liability, where the fault is 
considered.
2. De Minimis Defense to Strict Liability Laws
Even though revocation of the de minimis doctrine appears to suggest a doctrine 
of absolute liability, rather than strict liability, the resultant confusion could lead to 
questions regarding the treatment of the de minimis maxim in connection with strict 
liability interpretations.  Statutes that have been recognized as imposing strict liability on 
violators take two diametrically opposed approaches to the de minimis doctrine: 
exclusion and inclusion.  
First, certain areas of the law exclude the de minimis defense wholesale.  An 
example is the area of environmental law, which has reinforced the concept of liability 
without fault in several statutes.  Courts have noted that “[t]he Clean Water Act imposes 
strict liability for [the Honouliuli National Pollution Discharge Elimination System] and 
does not excuse ‘de minimis’ or ‘rare’ violations,”160 and that “the de minimis character 
of individual instances arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act [CERCLA] is of no consequence.”161
159 Grokster, – U.S. – , 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2779.
160 Hawaii’s Thousand Friends v. City and County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1392 (D. Haw. 1993), 
citing Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co. of California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1491 (9th Cir. 1987).  
161 See U.S. v. Domenic Lombardy Realty, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 318, 328 (D.R.I. 2002) (“Contrary to 
defendant's contentions, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under the [Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)] is of no consequence.”), citing
United States v. Olin, 107 F.3d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.1997), citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 
n.27 (1968).
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This adoption of a policy excluding the de minimis defense from instances of 
strict liability seems to be in line with what is considered to be the true definition of strict 
liability in the first place.  What differentiates a tort in strict liability from others is one of 
fault: Regardless of the amount of fault, even in instances of no fault, a defendant can be 
found liable for a violation.  The quantitative amount is irrelevant, as evident in the area 
of environmental law:  Because the very heart of environmental law is the health of 
humans, animals, plants, earth, air, and water; the smallest amount of pollution leads to 
harm to one or more of them.
However, even when human health is potentially at stake, the concept of holding 
every infraction liable for breaking the law may be untenable, causing certain areas of the 
law to include a de minimis analysis in the rubric for the most trivial of violations.  For 
example, in the laws of food safety, any instance of food adulteration is a violation of the 
Food and Drug Act.162  However, an exception is made for “unavoidable natural defects” 
(known in the industry as “filth”), because it is impossible to discover and destroy every 
single natural fragment from food that derives from natural sources.163 By definition, the 
“adulteration” of food is a violation of the Food and Drug Act.164 However, because the 
harm to consumers is potentially without harm, these de minimis infractions, as expressed 
by maximum tolerances in the FDA/CFSAN Defect Action Level Handbook, are viewed 
as acceptable by the Food and Drug Administration.165
162 See 21 C.F.R. § 110.110 (“Some foods, even when produced under current good manufacturing practice, 
contain natural or unavoidable defects that at low levels are not hazardous to health.”).  
163 Id.
164 See 21 U.S.C. § 342.  
165
 Food and Drug Administration Defect Action Level Handbook.  For example, ground oregano may have 
up to an average of 1,250 insect fragments per ten grams; chocolate may have up to 90 insect fragments or 
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Neither model is clearly analogous to copyright law.  Any harm to the holder of a 
copyright is economic, not physical, and as such is relatively petty when compared with 
an infraction of laws regulating substances that may result in human illness or death.166
However, when considering the harm to the individual copyright owner that may be 
affected by a de minimis violation of copyright law, the resultant injury is more akin to 
food and drug law, where the rights of an individual may be adversely impacted, as 
opposed to environmental law, where the general public may suffer harm.  Moreover, 
proponents of a strong public domain may argue that as a result of an overprotective 
copyright, the general public is harmed, as it would discourage creative works 
incorporating pieces of prior works.167
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO A DE MINIMIS DEFENSE
In a litigation-prone society and in light of increased attention afforded 
intellectual property in recent years, a defense of de minimis non curat lex may seem to 
be wholly illogical, especially given the number of defenses already available to incidents 
of copyright infringement.  While in certain instances, there may appear to be viable 
alternatives to a de minimis defense, in actuality, they cannot come close to protecting 
activities that should not give rise to a cause of action. 
A. Alternatives by Contract
1 rat hair per 100 grams (approximately 22 HERSHEY’S KISS chocolates); and up to 6% of potato chips 
by weight may contain rot.
166
 This has not kept the Sixth Circuit from finding de minimis violations of other financial statutes to be 
actionable.  See note ___, supra.
167 See, e.g. Peter K. Yu, “The Copyright Divide,” 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 331, 400-401 (November 2003) 
(discussing academic and legislative attempts to strengthen the public domain).
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A possible alternative to the employ of a de minimis defense is, of course, 
licensing, which would provide an alternative to an out-and-out violation of copyright 
law with permission granted from the copyright owner.168  The Sixth Circuit dictated as 
much to samplers with its edict, “Get a license or do not sample.”169  Organizations such 
as Lawrence Lessig’s Creative Commons have attempted to facilitate licensing to make it 
more accessible to the average composer, offering lawyer-free licenses to aspiring, 
sampling artists.170
But providing for a mere license may not be enough, and does not address the 
larger issue.  Hilary Rosen, former CEO of the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), notes that “[t]he biggest problem in commercial sampling isn’t that 
artists don’t know how to give away pieces of their work; it’s that they and their 
producers want to get paid more – a lot more – for smaller bits of their songs.”171
Without a de minimis defense to copyright infringement of sound recordings, even with 
licensing, the creative efforts of the next generation of musicians are certain to involve 
increased expense.172
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Moreover, forcing licenses upon every author who uses a two- or three-note series 
of recorded music could potentially be impracticable for artists not supported by major 
labels, further chilling creativity.  For example, one can imagine a song that is highly 
creative, highly original, but that uses two or three notes from a multitude of sound 
recordings consisting of three to five seconds apiece.  If the compilation of sound 
recordings is copied three times for a three-minute song, that would require twelve to 
twenty distinct samples.  Because “[m]ost publishers [of original music that is sampled in 
a later song] won’t take less than 20% ownership – no matter how minor the sample,”173
such an original work could result in zero ownership in the final work once all license 
rights have been doled out.
Finally, while a compulsory license may be sufficient protection for second-
comers in the areas of music, visual art, and literature, the issue becomes more 
problematic when dealing with a use such as databases or computer programs.  A 
compulsory license to use de minimis parts of a database, for example, runs extremely 
close to granting a monopoly on factual information.  A compulsory license for de 
minimis lines of code from a computer program would definitely stymie the “progress of 
science and the useful Arts,”174 as portions of code become almost generic in short 
periods of time.  
B. Reliance on Substantial Similarity and Fair Use
As noted above, the de minimis doctrine seems to be subsumed within the tests of 
substantial similarity and of fair use, rendering a second analysis unnecessary.  The test 
173
 Jim Bessman, Spotlight, Billboard (June 14, 2003) at 43 (quoting David Hirshland, executive vice 
president of Bug Music).  
174
 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.  
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of substantial similarity includes a quantitative component which seems to embrace and 
in some ways mirror the de minimis test, and the test for fair use employs the third factor 
in the four-part test to specify the quantitative amount of the material used.  It is logical 
that if a use of a copyrighted work raises de minimis possibilities, one would first 
examine whether an economic violation applies, then whether it falls within the scope of 
substantial similarity, and then whether the use could be excluded by fair use.175
In reality, however, this third factor has not been a reliable way to permit second 
comers to incorporate a quantifiably insignificant amount of a copyrighted work into a 
later work for a number of reasons.  First, the quadruplicate nature of the fair use defense 
dissuades a court from considering any one factor alone to negate a finding of 
infringement.  As the Ringgold court noted: 
Even if the third factor favors the defendants, courts considering 
the fair use defense…must be careful not to permit this factor too easily to 
tip the aggregate fair use assessment in favor of those whom the other 
three factors do not favor. Otherwise, a defendant who uses a creative 
work in a way that does not serve any of the purposes for which the fair 
use defense is normally invoked and that impairs the market for licensing 
the work will escape liability simply by claiming only a small 
infringement.176
Conversely, where a defendant’s use may be quantifiably insignificant, a court may 
consider the purpose of the work to be purely commercial and without the scope of fair 
use.
Additionally, courts have made it clear that the third factor does not prevent a 
quantifiably insignificant amount from constituting infringement if the portion of the 
175 See supra n. __, citing Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, 147 F. 3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the 
de minimis defense should be evaluated in the context of substantial similarity before applying it through 
fair use).
176 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 70.
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work used is qualitatively significant.  In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, for example, the Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the third 
fair use factor to determine that while a relatively quantifiably insignificant amount of 
President Gerald Ford's memoirs had been taken by the reporting newspaper, the portion 
was the “heart” of President Ford’s work, and therefore could not be considered 
insignificant.177  Noted the Court, “In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and 
their key role in the infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second Circuit that the 
‘magazine took a meager, indeed and infinitesimal amount of Ford’s original language,’” 
even though the amount of material copied was “insubstantial.”178
Even though Congress has not afforded weight to any one factor over another, 
courts have readily acknowledged that they contribute less significance to the third fair 
use factor related to the other three factors of the fair use test.  The Harper & Row Court 
supra found that the fourth factor, “effect of use on the market,” “is undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use.”179 The Supreme Court has also stated that 
analysis of the third factor cannot stand alone, but must take place in conjunction with an 
analysis of the purpose and character of the use.180  The Ninth Circuit has stated that 
“where the ultimate (as opposed to direct) use is as limited as it was here, [the third] 
factor is of very little weight,”181 and that “under circumstances, a court will conclude 
177
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that a use is fair even when the protected work is copied in its entirety.”182  Thus, even 
though the unpredictability of the analysis of the factor may be as likely to favor fair use 
as it is to weigh against it, that very unpredictability renders the statutory language a slim 
guarantee that a de minimis defense may be upheld with any regularity through fair use.
As a result, although the doctrine of fair use is intended to broaden the scope of 
the public domain so that the freedom of speech is secure, interestingly, the ability to 
apply the de minimis defense within its parameters is narrow.  
The fair use analysis is undertaken only if substantial similarity does not apply.  
However, substantial similarity is also not comprehensive enough to constitute a panacea 
for de minimis violations.  First, substantial similarity is focused on the insignificant use 
of the work; i.e., whether the second comer’s use will give rise for the average observer 
to recognize the appropriation.  This potentially excludes a type of violation where the 
average observer recognizes the appropriation, but the plaintiff has suffered little to no 
economic harm as a result of the appropriation.  Not all of these “technical” violations of 
copyright, as suggested above, would be appropriately analyzed using a substantial 
similarity rubric. 
1. Procedural considerations
Regardless of whether the de minimis infringement has economic or similarity 
insignificance, the continued employ of the maxim de minimis non curat lex as its own 
defense has import for the intention of judicial economy.  Because copyright 
182 A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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infringement is an exclusively federal cause of action,183 an action of copyright 
infringement by its nature should be mindful of the preservation of principles of 
efficiency, both temporal and economic.184  In a perfect world, if a violation or a damage 
is indeed de minimis, a litigant would not bring the action in the first place.
When litigants do bring causes of action including causes of action possibly 
excluded by the de minimis doctrine, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allow for mechanisms to dispose of those causes of action without necessitating an 
expensive jury trial.  The success of those mechanisms – such as a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim,185 motion for judgment on the pleadings,186 and motion for 
summary judgment 187 – is dependent upon the lack of a legally sufficient basis to bring a 
cause of action, as opposed to the relative weight of the evidence.  A rule dictating that 
when a violation of copyright is economically insignificant to the plaintiff or is 
indistinguishable to the average observer, the infringement is not actionable as a matter of 
law by virtue of de minimis non curat lex, would further the policy purposes of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
These motions can be used early on in litigation proceedings to prevent the 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction over defendants and over actions.  A litigant may 
have difficulty choosing a forum for a de minimis infringement due to a potential lack of 
183 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2005) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to … copyrights…. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the 
courts of the states in … copyright cases.”).  
184
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 (2005) (“[The Rules of Civil Procedure] shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”).
185
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2005), Rule 12(b)(6).
186
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2005), Rule 12(c).
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 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2005), Rule 56.
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personal jurisdiction.  “Because a copyright is an intangible, incorporeal right, it has no 
situs apart from the domicile of the proprietor, and hence, a copyright infringement action 
must be based upon in personam jurisdiction,”188 which governs the personal liabilities of 
the defendant and not the status of any piece of property.189  In order for a court’s 
exercise of one of these types of personal jurisdiction over a defendant to meet 
constitutional procedural due process, the cause of action must arise out of the 
defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state.190  The defendant must have 
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of the forum state where the 
cause of action arose, and it must have been able to reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court there.191  The unilateral action of another may not be sufficient to draw a defendant 
into the forum state.192  Even if these minimum contacts are established, a court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant may not meet constitutional due process 
standards if the exercise of jurisdiction offends the notion of fair play and substantial 
justice.193  If the cause of action does not arise out of a defendant’s minimum contacts 
with the forum state, a court must exercise jurisdiction through general personal 
188 See 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.01[C] at 12-30.
189 See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
190 See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
191 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 
(1980).
192 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
193 See Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), 
citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
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jurisdiction, based on a defendant’s systematic and continuous contacts with the forum 
state.194
Absent an infringer’s specific and continuous contacts with the forum state, the 
court must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction based on the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum state.  However, this may create a problem when dealing with an 
infringement that may satisfy the test of de minimis non curat lex.  An infringement that 
is insignificant enough to call into question whether it is actionable may similarly call 
into question whether the contacts are significant enough with a forum state to meet the 
required minimum contacts or cause the defendant to be aware he is purposefully availing 
himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state.  Without the de minimis
defense as a matter of law, a court may improperly exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant while determining whether its de minimis activity was substantially similar 
after potentially lengthy discovery and motion proceedings.  This could especially create 
jurisdictional problems for international defendants.195
Moreover, without a separate defense that can be asserted as a matter of law 
before trial, a federal court may improperly extend subject matter jurisdiction.  A court 
may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those causes of action which normally would 
be deemed legally insufficient, if there is original jurisdiction over a primary claim 
substantially related to the insufficient causes of action.196  A case involving a single 
194 See Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
195 See generally  Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI Principles on Trnasnational Intellectual Property Disputes: 
Why Invite Conflicts?, 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 819 (Issue 3, 2005) (discussing principles of jurisdiction over 
international defendants).
196 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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copyright claim has original jurisdiction in the federal courts.197  Litigants may add 
causes of action to a complaint asserting copyright infringement under supplemental 
jurisdiction, even if the cause of action asserting copyright infringement may be rebuffed 
by a de minimis defense.  Without the ability to determine whether a claim of copyright 
infringement is not actionable early in the litigation, a federal court may opt to continue 
to exercise jurisdiction over the claims over which it had no jurisdiction in the first place, 
as dismissal of those claims is discretionary.198
2. Policy Considerations
The effects of a limitation on the application of the de minimis effects are 
potentially far-reaching.  Far from being an acknowledged boon for the entertainment 
industry, the Bridgeport decision has drawn mixed reviews from the music world.  A 
civil disobedience group attempted a grass-roots campaign to protest the decision, 
inviting activists to “download the copyrighted riff and use it to craft new, 30-second 
songs,” resulting in “hundreds of diverse submissions.”199  This decision is also at odds 
with many in the music industry itself.  Rapper Chuck D said in an interview with Wired, 
“If you’re taking bits of music and organizing them in a way that makes the result a 
distinctly personal creation, then I don’t feel that you’re infringing on copyright…. Sound 
should be considered up for grabs.”200
197 See supra n. ___, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 
198 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) (giving a district court discretion of whether to decline jurisdiction once  
jurisdiction over the primary claim has been dismissed).  Of course, the court has discretion at the 
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likely to choose not to exercise such jurisdiction a copyright claim is dismissed early in the proceedings.
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In addition to affecting the entertainment industry, however, a limitation of the de 
minimis doctrine such as the one that the Sixth Circuit imposed has definite implications 
for the field of copyright law.  Even if such a restriction is limited to sound recordings, 
neither the abolition of the substantial similarity test nor the alteration of the fair use test 
would advance the aims of Congress with respect to copyrighted works.  Moreover, such 
a limitation promotes the notion that copyright infringement is subject to a strict liability 
standard, something which has not been evident in judicial opinions interpreting 
copyright laws.  Further, even though the Sixth Circuit was careful to mention that the 
scope of the decision extended only to the medium of sound recordings, it is possible that 
the logic of the decision could be extended, purposely or otherwise, to other media 
protected by copyright.201
Again looking to the law concerning databases, copyright does not exist merely as 
a reward to those who put in effort to copyrighted works.  An illustration exists again in 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of databases in Feist with respect to the “sweat of the 
brow” doctrine.  The basic principle of the “sweat of the brow” doctrine was “that 
copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts.”202  The court 
rejected this approach:  “[T]o accord copyright protection on this basis alone distorts 
basic copyright principles in that it creates a monopoly in public domain materials 
without the necessary justification of protecting and encouraging the creation of 
‘writings’ by ‘authors.’”203  As demonstrated by the Harry Potter example above, a 
201
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copyright in the sound recording of a copyrighted work potentially affords the author less 
protection than the person that merely fixes a performance of the work.  This potentially 
rewards the entity that input the least creativity.204 However, far from receiving more 
copyright protection, perhaps a new creative work based on a new mode of technology 
should receive less copyright protection than the protection afforded the work that 
represents the first expression of an original creative work in the first place, allowing the 
creative work to become the building blocks for new works to come.
V. CONCLUSION
In a coincidental choice of words, the Supreme Court in Feist stated that 
“…copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a 
de minimis quantum of creativity.”205 It makes sense that de minimis portions of a 
copyrighted work contain only a de minimis quantum of creativity.  The abolition of the 
de minimis defense with respect to any medium covered by the Copyright Act does not 
serve to promote creativity, but to stifle it. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “Intellectual 
(and artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on the work of others.”206
The oft-quoted Constitutional directive for Congress with respect to intellectual property 
204 See Metro-Gold-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., --- S.Ct. ---, (Jun. 27, 2005), citing Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, supra, at 442, 104 S.Ct. 774; Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New 
Technologies of Dissemination, 101 Colum. L.Rev. 1613 (2001); Lichtman & Landes, Indirect Liability for 
Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 395 (2003).  In the recent 
Grokster opinion, Justice Breyer recently framed a tension between creativity and technology as such: “The 
more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the 
administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off.”
205 Feist, 499 U.S.  at ___.
206 Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990).
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is to “promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts.”207  Without some reliance on 
prior works, such progress is impossible.  
In Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban, teenage Harry, annoyed with his 
visiting aunt,208 caused her to “inflat[e] like a monstrous balloon,”209 in direct violation of 
wizard laws.  Harry was certain that this would land him in Azkaban, the wizard prison.
Yet then he had the following dialogue with the Minister of Magic, Cornelius Fudge:
“I broke the law!” Harry said. “The Decree for the Restriction of 
Underage Wizardry!”
“Oh, my dear boy, we’re not going to punish you for a little thing 
like that!” cried Fudge… “It was an accident! We don’t send 
people to Azkaban just for blowing up their aunts!”210
Obviously, the parallels are imperfect, but the message is clear:  Some violations 
of the law are too insignificant to assign guilt or liability.  De minimis non curat lex:  The 
law does not concern itself with trifles.  From its longstanding roots in English law to 
applications for new technology in the future, it is – and should remain – a necessary 
defense to the tort of copyright infringement.  And after all, if the wizarding world can 
recognize a defense too insignificant for liability, perhaps, then, so should we.
207
 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8.  
208
 Actually, Marjorie Dursley was Harry’s Aunt Petunia’s husband’s sister, but he had always been forced 
to call her “Aunt” Marge.  J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban at 19.
209 Azkaban at 27.
210 Azkaban at 38-39.
